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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the check by the one who finally signs,"' 7 the comptroller's signature vali-
dated the check, and by allowing it to be paid, the drawer guaranteed its
genuineness. 18 Thus the drawer admits "the existence of the payee and his
then capacity to indorse,"'19 and that the execution of the check with the
payee's indorsement thereon, was an implied acknowledgement of the
genuineness of the indorsement.
It is submitted that the court might also have found that appellee,
drawer, was estopped from recovery on the check because the comptroller's
signature was equivalent to an order to pay without reference to the genuine-
ness of the indorsements2 0  However, the court did note appellee's irregular
business methods and equitably refused recovery by placing the financial
burden upon the person who had the last opportunity to avoid the loss.
REAL PROPERTY - TITLES - SURVIVAL OF EASEMENT
UNDER TAX SALE
Defendant acquired the tax-sale title to an alleyway which had been
subject to easements by appurtenant property owners, and attempted to halt
the use of the easements. Held, the tax sale of a servient estate does not
extinguish an appurtenant dominant easement. Engel v. Catucci, 197 F.2d
597 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
Generally, by statute, a tax deed of delinquent property is in the nature
of a new and independent grant from the sovereign and vests a new and
absolute title in fee in the purchaser.' However, a large majority of the
jurisdictions which so provide, hold that an appurtenant easement survives
a tax sale of the property.2 Some states make specific statutory provision
that appurtenant easements will survive.3 This is based on the theory that
the easement is not taxed with the servient estate, but is carved out of the
property and is separate from it. The easement is taxed with the dominant
17. Goodyear Tire & R. Co. v. Wells Fargo & U.T. Co., 1 Cal. App.2d 694, 37 P.2d
483, 489 (1934); Globe Indemnity Co. v. First Nat. Bank in St. Louis, 133 S.W.2d
1066, 1072 (Mo. 1939).
18. Horstman v. Henshaw, 11 How. 177 (1850); Cogill v. The American Exchange
Bank, I N.Y. (Comstock) 113 (1847); Meacher v. Fort, 3 Hill (S.C.) 227 (1837).
TIhe drawer of a bill affirms the genuineness of the forged indorsement by passing the
bill into circulation. But cf. Robarts v. Tucker, 13 Q.B. 560, 117 Eng. Reprints 994(1851). See 2 MORSE, BANrS AND BANKING § 477 (5th ed. 1917).
19. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 61; FLA. STAT. § 674.63 (1951).
20. See note 15 supra.
I. Rist v. Toole County, 117 Mont. 426, 159 P.2d 340 (1945); Polenz v. City of
Ravenna, 145 Neb. 845, 18 N.W.2d 510 (1945); Warren v. Blackman, 62 S.D. 26, 250
N.W. 681 (1933). Contra: Cornett v. Swift Coal and Timber Co., 112 F.2d 387 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 659 (1940); Gunter v. Townsend, 202 Ala. 160, 79 So. 644
(1918); City of Beckley v. Hatcher, 67 S.E.2d 20 (W.Va. 1951).
2. Ross v. Franko, 139 Ohio St. 395, 40 N.E.2d 664 (1942). Also Kan., N.H., N.J.,
N.M., Ohio, Okla,, Ore., Pa., Utah and Wisc.
3. MAss. GEm. LAws, c. 60, § 45 (1932); N.Y. TAx LAw § 154, IowA CODE§ 448.3 (1949) (restrictive covenants will survive).
CASES NOTED
estate.4  Thus the absolute title, which is given of the servient estate, is
exclusive of the easement.5
The real estate tax is based upon the market value of the land, disregard-
ing independent interests such as dower, liens, mortgages and encumbrances,
and hence a tax deed extinguishes them.7 Easements, on the other hand,
are taken into consideration in the assessment of the property., Their value
is added to the dominant estate, and subtracted from the servientY Thus it
has been said that the extinguishment of an easement due to tax sale would
be a deprivation of property without due process of law. 10
It has been held that a restrictive covenant which runs with the land is
in the nature of a negative easement.1 These are sometimes held to survive
a tax sale, mainly on grounds of public policy. 12
Florida' 3 and the minority of states hold that since land is taxed as an
entirety without regard to the interests comprising it, all easements, as well
as interests, liens and encumbrances, are lost by the new sovereign grant.
14
The theory of the minority is that it is impractical to assess the separate
interests in land. 5
In further modification of the two basic rules, it has been held that the
failure to alter an original assessment after a subsequent easement takes ef-
fect, results in loss of the easement21 Some states hold it to be immaterial
whether or not the easement was actually considered in the assessment of
4. Gowen v. Swain, 90 N.H. 383, 10 A.2d 249 (1939); Alamagardo Improvement
Co. v. Prendergast, 43 N.M. 245, 91 P.2d 428 (1939); Union Falls Power Co. v.
Marinette County, 238 Wis. 134, 298 N.W. 598 (1941).
5. Crawford v. Senosky, 128 Ore. 229, 274 Pac. 306 (1929); Tidewater Pipe Co. v.
Bell, 280 Pa. 104, 124 At. 351 (1924).
6. Bonbright, Valuation of Real Estate for Tax Purposes, 34 COL. L. REV. 1436
(1934).
7. Rist v. Toole City, 117 Mont. 426, 159 P.2d 340 (1945); Polenz v. City of
Ravenna, 145 Neb. 845, 18 N.W.2d 510 (1945); Warren v. Blackman, 62 S.D. 26, 250
N.W. 681 (1933).
8. Alamagardo Improvement Co. v. Prendergast, 43 N.M. 245, 91 P.2d 428 (1939);
Gulf Refining Co. v. Jenkins, 194 Okla. 331, 151 P.2d 419 (1944); Hayes v. Gibbs, 110
Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781 (19461.
9. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McGurk, 119 N.J.L. 517, 197 Atd. 47 (1938); Ross
v. Franko, 139 Ohio St. 395, 40 N.E.2d 664 (1942).
10. Tax Lien Co. of N.Y. v. Schultz, 213 N.Y. 9, 106 N.E. 751 (1914); Hayes v.
Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781 (1946).
11. Schlafly v. Baumann, 341 Mo. 755, 108 S.W.2d 363 (1937); Northwestern Im-
provement Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289, 66 P.2d 792 (1937); Doherty v. Rice, 240 Wis.
389, 3 N.W.2d 734 (1942).
12. Schlafly v. Baumann, 341 Mo. 755, 108 S.W.2d 363 (1937); Alamagardo Im-
provement Co. v. Prendergast, 43 N.M. 245, 91 P.2d 428 (1939).
13. Wolfson v. -leins, 149 Fla. 499, 6 So.2d 858 (1942). However, by statute,
easements for public service purposes and restrictive covenants survive a tax sale. FLA.
STATS. §§ 192.58, 192.33 (1951).
14. Allied American Investment Co. v. Pettit, 65 Ariz. 283, 179 P.2d 437 (1948);
Hill v. Williams, 104 Md. 595, 65 Atl. 413 (1906); City of Jackson v. Ashley, 189 Miss.
818, 199 So. 91 (1940) (restrictive covenants are lost by tax sale).
15. Hill v. Williams, 104 Md. 595, 65 Atl. 413 (1906).
16. Conlin v. Metzger, 44 N.W.2d 617 (N.D. 1950); Hannon v. Gould, 1 Wash.2d
1, 94 P.2d 749 (1939); Hanson v. Carr, 66 Vash. 81, 118 Pac. 927 (1911) (for easement
to survive, tax assessor must be informed).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the servient cstate. 17 It has also been held that if part of the casement is
taxed, then that portion survives.' 8
In the principle case, the court extcndcd the majority view that the case-
mcnt is carved from the servient estate, is apart from it, and is not taxed
with it. This is the more logical view, and is compatible with the theory
that an absolute title is given of the servicnt cstate, as required by statute,
and yet protects the dominant estate. The logic of this reasoning must be
conceded. However, such a fine distinction does defeat the giving of an
actual unencumbered grant to the tax purchaser.
TORTS-DENIAL OF INTERVENTION BY INSURER UNDER
FLORIDA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Plaintiff, in course of her employment, was severely injured by de-
fendant's automobile. The employee had filed her claim against the em-
ployer and the insurance carrier, but subsequently brought the present action
against defendant. The insurance carrier, which had already paid the sum
of $6,750 as required by the Workmen's Compensation Law, moved to
intervene in the suit as party-plaintiff. Motion was denied. Held, under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, employer's insurance carrier was not en-
titled to intervene as a party-plaintiff in a suit by an injured employee against
a third-party tort-fcasor. The injured employee was not required to bring
such suit for herself and for the use and benefit of insurance carrier.'
Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Bedingfeld, 60 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1952).
In the 47 states that have enacted workmen's compensation acts,2 there
is little uniformity among the various provisions and any attempt to classify
the particular statutes pertaining to the liability of third persons is difficult.3
Florida, by enacting the new amendment to its Workmen's Compensation
Act, became one of the states now adhering to the liberal policy which.
enables the employee to simultaneously accept compensation and sue the
third party.' The employer or insurance carrier is subrogated, to the extent
17. Gulf Refining Co. v. Jenkins, 194 Okla. 331, 151 P.2d 419 (1944); Hayes v.
Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781 (1946) (the value of the servient estate need not be
lowered).
18. Magnolia v. Moyle, 162 Kan. 133, 175 P.2d 133 (1946).
1. FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (1951) as amended Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26546, abolishing
the election requirement and providing that an injured employee may claim workmen's
compensation benefits and at the same time institute suit against a third party tort-feasor.
It further provides that such suit may be brought in the name of the injured employee
as plaintiff or, at the option of the injured employee, may be brought in the name of
the injured employee for the use and benefit of the employer or insurance carrier, as the
case may be, as plaintiffs.
2. Mississippi is the only state that has no workmen's compensation act.
3. MONT. L. REV. 91 (1946).
4. See 7 MONT. L. REV. 91-94 (1946) for a complete analysis as to how the various
jurisdictions treat third party liability in workmen's compensation acts generally.
